Posts Tagged ‘Corporate Governance’

Help for a Broken System

Monday, May 6th, 2013

Help for a Broken System

Originally published at Board Member magazine 2013 Q2.

Somewhere along the way, executive compensation veered off the road.  It became too complex, isolated from true performance and downside risk, and in many cases, too high.  The original idea of executive compensation was to pay an adequate and fair wage and good benefits.  Any additional pay was intended to place executives in the same position as owners.  However, with high base salaries, equally powerful short-term incentives, long-term incentives that are treated as income rather than investment and often protect against downside risk, and the potential for golden parachute payments that reward executives when they fail, something went wrong.  The good news is that it can be fixed.  The bad news is that it will require some bold new thinking on the part of boards and management.

Performance.  Before discussing pay, let’s examine performance.

  • More often than not we reward CEOs for luck and good timing rather than for leadership, stewardship and good strategy.  Research has shown that as much as 80% of total return may be based on macro-economic factors and industry trends unrelated to company behavior.
  • Performance against internally-developed goals is important, but may be unrelated to actions that build long-term value for investors.  If a CEO is truly operating at a strategic level, the real impact of their leadership may not be evident for 5-10 years, and in some industries with long development or capital cycles, perhaps 15 years.  Yet for the most part we define CEO performance in terms of annual financial results rather than on more broad indicators of long-term value creation.
  • Current year plan-based targets, ROIC and share price are all great dashboard measures, indicating directional progress, but these measures should not be confused with actual success of a strategy or long-term value creation within an organization.  Boards need to think long and broad when it comes to assessing performance.

If we are to improve the pay model, we must first be willing to commit to a longer-term view of performance and articulate exactly what success looks like.

Pay.  Much of the current executive compensation thinking is a product of the 1980’s and 1990’s.  Many of today’s practices are influenced by the SEC efforts to standardize disclosure in an effort to bring more transparency and comparability to executive pay.  Unfortunately, as with many things, there were unintended consequences.

  • We think about and communicate pay in annual terms rather than in long-term outcomes.  If in doubt, read the “compensation philosophy” section of the typical CD&A.
  • We emphasize annual bonuses that pit CEO’s self-interest against investors when negotiating performance targets.
  • We claim that equity is an incentive to create alignment and balance risk, but we allocate it on the basis of “competitive pay” like cash; we too rarely acknowledge an intended career allocation or a targeted ownership objective.
  • We rationalize equity programs as putting executives in the same position as owners, but, in our experience executives rarely lose money. Annual equity awards are typically based on dollar-denominated “target values”, protecting executives from stock price changes, and executive stock holdings are often sold to the extent they exceed minimal ownership requirements.
  • We use “competitive practice” as a synonym for minimum requirement, whether dealing with salary and incentives, terms of employment, or severance.  As a board we seldom exercise leadership in crafting employment arrangements directly supportive of the company’s mission.

To say that executive pay is “broken” may seem overly harsh, but we should at least acknowledge that executive pay often falls far short of delivering on its objective of rewarding executives for long-term value creation.  The first step in the cure is admitting you have a problem.

In later articles, we will examine several solutions to these problems.

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The Risks of Accelerating 2012 Bonus Payments

Friday, October 19th, 2012

The Risks of Accelerating 2012 Bonus Payments

With continuing uncertainty regarding the nation’s finances fueled by current election banter, executives are faced with the temptation to accelerate payments into 2012 to avoid increasing income tax rates.  If Congress does not act, the typical executive could save in excess of 5%[1] of the amount of the payment.  In reviewing these requests, board members are advised to consider the old adage, “There is no such thing as a free lunch.”

Companies have accelerated payments to executives in the past to avoid tax rate changes.  Most notably, in late 1993 a significant minority of companies accelerated executive bonus awards that otherwise would have been paid in 1994, to avoid the uncapping of the 1.45% Medicare tax.  Unfortunately, tax increases under presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton did not provide the same opportunity for tax planning.

With the risk of Bush-era tax cuts expiring, board members could be asked to consider acceleration of incentive payments for their organizations.  Should your board be asked to weigh in on this issue, we suggest you consider the following.

  • While the request is typically for the benefit of senior executives, the benefit of accelerating income may go well beyond the executive ranks.  Nearly all full-time wage earners could face a tax increase of at least 3%.  Given the public concern over exceptional treatment of executives, particularly the CEO, we suggest boards discuss whether a limited action only benefiting senior management is appropriate, or whether an all-or-none approach may be warranted.
  • While the executive may save 5% in taxes, the acceleration has an economic cost to shareholders.  It is objectively fair to assess the economic cost of the accelerated payment at the company’s cost of incremental debt.  While some companies are currently experiencing very low borrowing costs, for others, the 2 ½ month advance payment will likely have an economic cost to shareholders of 2-3% or more.  While this economic cost is not an expense reported on the summary compensation table it is a cost incurred by the company and should be part of an informed discussion.
  • There are consequences of accelerating payment in terms of making individual or organization performance assessments and in terms of protecting the company in the event of and termination of employment prior to the end of the performance period.  Board members should consider whether contractual protections are warranted to clawback or adjust any award made in error or made prior to a having a full appreciation of company and individual performance over the entire performance period.  Further, an advance payment that is contingent upon later results could conceivably constitute a loan specifically prohibited by Sarbanes-Oxley[2].
  • There may be risks to the company’s public image and brand.  Given the level of public scrutiny currently provided executive compensation, it is not inconceivable that the act of taking exceptional action to avoid taxation for executives may draw the company and the board into a public debate they cannot win.  Keep in mind that the rationale for the acceleration would likely require some narrative in the Compensation Disclosure and Analysis section of the proxy statement.
  • Lastly, there could be tax consequence with accelerated payment.  Most companies’ 162(m)-qualified plans require compensation committee certification of results and prohibit “positive discretion.  Any acceleration could potentially jeopardize the company’s tax deduction for the award.

Clearly, we do not consider the acceleration of payments to be a “slam dunk” decision.  While it may be appropriate and non-controversial under many circumstances, such a decision can only be made by a board when benefitting from a full appreciation of each organization’s unique facts and underlying economics.

 

-          Jeff McCutcheon

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[1] i.e., Reversion of the top tax bracket from 35% back to 39.6%, plus the impact of reinstatement of the phase out of itemized deductions.

[2] Section 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits companies from making loans or arranging credit for named executive officers.  Public companies should seek legal advice prior to accelerating payments to executive officers.

Compensation Advisor Independence

Thursday, July 12th, 2012

Compensation Advisor Independence

The SEC recently published new rules on Compensation Committee Independence and Outside Advisers (17 CFR Parts 229 and 240), including specific factors to be used by the national exchanges in determining compensation advisor independence.  The intent of this evolving regulation is to establish standards for compensation committees and their advisors that are comparable to the standards established over a decade ago for the audit committees and external auditors.  However, after three years in the making, the resulting rules fail to establish any real test for independence.  Worse, the resulting “factors” are inconsistent with existing audit committee standards and compensation committee member (director) independence standards.    Regrettably, the resulting rules are more the inevitable outcome of successful lobbying efforts on the part of the compensation consulting industry than reflective of any rising standard for conduct by compensation committees and their advisors.

The Act and the subsequent SEC rules ignore the most likely conflict of interest facing compensation committees; that firms will derive the lion’s share revenue from any single client engagement serving management, and therefore be hesitant to upset management when completing an assignment with the compensation committee or the board.  This is perfectly analogous to the situation in the 1990’s with audit firms conducting large-scale consulting assignments for management in the same firms they were supposedly auditing.  We get it — independence means you can serve only one party.

The legislature erred in establishing two of the factors in their drafting of 10C (b)(2).

  • First, the rules establish as a factor the “provision of other services to the issuer” by the consulting firm, and do not consider the magnitude of the total fees attributable to the “other services” provided.  This fails to differentiate minor services that may be provided to management by a board consultant that do not pose a threat to advisor independence.  Using the audit analogy, it is not uncommon for external auditors to still provide services to management; it simply requires advance approval by the audit committee and disclosure to investors.
  • Second, the rules establish as a factor fees paid by the issuer as a percent of total consulting firm revenue, without considering the nature of the fees (i.e., management vs. board services).  Clearly, if 100% of the fees are derived from the board relationship, interests are aligned and there is no conflict, independent of any concentration of consulting firm revenue derived from the relationship.  In auditing, we find no consideration of audit income as a percent of firm income being relevant to the independence standard (nor is director concentration of income from the issuer a factor in establishing director independence).  This factor is at best a red herring, at worst, a triumph of lobbying over shareholder interests.

It is our opinion the only amount of fees that are relevant are the fees earned for advising the Board versus the fees earned by advising management.  When proxies report fees of $200,000 for advising the Compensation Committee and $2,000,000 for advising management on pension and welfare matters, it is difficult to see any independence.

Clearly the legislative staff was concerned about disrupting this industry. The Dodd-Frank legislative process considered input from a number of sources, including several of the large multi-service consulting firms, and includes a preamble to specifically establish that the independence factors be “competitively neutral among categories of consultants…”.  Unlike auditor independence, where Sarbanes-Oxley created a bright line that clearly disadvantaged firms with conflicts of interest, this Act attempts to protect even those situations where a conflict exists, to “preserve the ability of compensation committees to retain…” advisors even when obvious conflicts exist.

Fortunately, we do believe that in spite of Dodd-Frank, boards are migrating to conflict-free committee members and conflict-free committee advisors.  As a result, we find multi-service consulting firms continuing to spin off their executive pay consulting units.  Market share for the multi-service firms has continued to erode since the late 90’s, indicating that most boards – independent of regulation – are mindful of both the potential for conflict of interest and the appearance of conflict of interest, and choose firms specializing in board-level consulting services.  We clearly are on a trajectory to end up with the same model as with audit firms, albeit at a more confused pace.

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- Paul McConnell & Jeff McCutcheon (Managing Directors of Board Advisory, LLC)

Governance in 2011: The Highs & Lows

Tuesday, January 3rd, 2012

Governance in 2011: The Highs & Lows

Paul McConnell of Board Advisory was quoted in this week’s Agenda newsletter on corporate governance in 2011.

Original Article By: Amanda Gerut (January 3, 2012)

Last year’s hot corporate governance stories tended to describe how boards led the way — or withered — in the face of challenge. Herewith, based on Agenda’s reader statistics, the high and low points of boardroom behavior in 2011.

Hall of Fame:

1. After ISS recommended that shareholders vote against executive compensation plans at Alcoa, Assured Guaranty, General Electric, Lockheed Martin and The Walt Disney Company, their boards regrouped and altered elements of executives’ comp to gain the proxy advisor’s support — and shareholder votes. As Agenda reported in May, Alcoa, GE and Lockheed Martin amended the terms of equity awards previously granted to executives, while Assured Guaranty and Disney eliminated some promised benefits.“Listening to shareholders is always an example of good governance,” says Paul McConnell, a partner with executive compensation and governance firm Board Advisory — although he points out that it’s not clear whether ISS actually represents shareholders or just assumes what they think.

 

Continue reading the article on Agenda Week Online